THE SKEWED RESPONSIBILITY NARRATIVE OF
THE "FAILED STATES" CONCEPT
Ralph Wilde*
The "failed state" concept, which came to prominence in academic and
policy discourse in the early 1990's with the publication of David Helman and
Steven Ratner's 1991 article Saving Failed States,' continues to enjoy
widespread currency as a way of denoting situations where the governmental
infrastructure in a state has broken down to a considerable degree. It can be
criticized on a number of levels, from its essentialist use of language to the
particularist basis for defining "failure," and the manner in which it sets up a
dichotomous opposition within international relations between "successful" and
"failed" states.3 In this brief article, I discuss one such criticism: the way that
the term "failure" suggests exclusive responsibility on the part of the state and
its people for the breakdown in governance. I consider the problematic aspects
of this suggestion with reference to one of the key policy prescriptions that are
associated with the failed states paradigm:
granting administrative
responsibilities over the territory concerned to international organizations,
which in the context of governmental collapse can be used to fill the

*

Lecturer in Law, University College London, University of London, ralph.wilde@ucl.ac.uk.

This article draws from a broader piece of work discussing some of the different ways in which questions of
legitimacy are framed by the language used in international legal discourse. That work forms part of a
research project under the auspices of the United Nations University (UNU) in Tokyo on "The Faultlines of
Legitimacy in International Law," convened by Hilary Charlesworth of the Australian National University
and Jean-Marc Coicaud of the UNU. An edited volume on the subject will be published by the UNU in 2003.
The argument made in this article was presented at the Annual Conference of the British Branch of the
International Law Association, entitled "When States Fail," held in Oxford on 12 April 2002, and on the
"Faultlines of Legitimacy in International Law" panel at the International Law Association (American Branch)
Annual Conference, New York, 25 Oct. 2002. Warm thanks are due to the other members of the UNU project,
Professor James Crawford of Cambridge University, Josh Homes of University College London and the
participants at the above conferences for their helpful comments. I am grateful to University College London
for providing financial assistance to enable me to attend the conference in New York.
I.

See Gerald B. Helman & Steven R. Ratner, Saving Failed States 89 Foreign Pol'y 3 (1992).

2.

E.g. Margaret P. Karns & Karen A. Mingst, Peackeeping and the Changing Role of the United

Nations: Four dilemmas, in UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: AD HOC MISSIONS, PERMANENT

ENGAGEMENT 215 (Ramesh Thakur & Albrecht Schnabel eds., 2001).
3.
For some of these criticisms, see Henry J. Richardson, "Failed States," Self-Determination, and
Preventative Diplomacy: Colonialist Nostalgia and Democratic Expectations, 10 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.
J. 1 (1996) and Ruth Gordon, Saving Failed States: Sometimes A Neocolonialist Notion, 12 AM. U.J. INT'L L.&
POL'Y 903 (1997).

426

ILSA Journalof International& ComparativeLaw [Vol. 9:425

governmental vacuum and/or to construct, or reconstruct, essential state
institutions.4 This policy institution, currently underway in Kosovo and
conducted in East Timor from the end of 1999 to May 2002, was proposed by
Helman and Ratner as a mechanism (termed "United Nations Conservatorship")
for "saving" failed states. It is invariably considered when the different policy
options available as responses to particular situations of governmental collapse
are being reviewed, as in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban at the end of
2001. Although in practice plenary international territorial administration is
often ultimately rejected in this context (Cf., Afghanistan). Moreover, it is
sometimes used to pursue entirely different objectives (e.g. enabling the transfer
of territory from one actor to another, as in West Irian in 1963-64 and Eastern
Slavonia in 1996-98).
The "failed state" label arguably suggests that when governmental
infrastructure collapses, the state, its people, and its leaders are solely
responsible; it is the "state" that has "failed." Henry Richardson highlights this
feature of the "failed state" concept, and criticizes it as simplistic. 6 Of course
state collapse is often due, to a considerable degree, to indigenous factors,
whether civil conflict or corrupt leadership. At the same time, clearly the
involvement of foreign states, international financial institutions such as the
IMF and the World Bank, multinational corporations, and the like often plays
a major role in mediating the state of local conditions, thereby affecting the
viability of the economy and governmental infrastructure. For example, should
exclusive responsibility for the governmental breakdown in the Congo in the
1960's lie at the door of the Congolese people and their leaders?7 To make this
assertion, one should somehow discount the role of Belgium, for example, who
"failed" to prepare local people for government before independence, and then
intervened militarily in the country afterwards to support certain factions during
the civil war.' East Timor became a state in May 2002. If, in two years time,
the government there collapses, would it really be appropriate to conceive
responsibility for that solely in terms of the local population? Clearly, one
cannot look only at the behavior of local actors in seeking to appraise a
particular national economy and political system. Regrettably, this is exactly
what the "failed state" concept does.
The skewed notion of responsibility arguably suggested by the failed state
idea is not only misconceived; it also leads to policy prescriptions that, by
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themselves, may ignore the structural causes of the problems they seek to
address. The use of international territorial administration to respond to
situations of infrastructural collapse is a case in point. Necessarily, international
territorial administration is concerned exclusively with the local causes of this
situation, seeking, for example, to improve local capacities for governance.
Clearly, it has no remit with respect to, for example, the foreign states,
international financial institutions and multinational corporations that will play
as important a role in shaping the future of the territory's economy as local
people and their leaders. I am not suggesting that international territorial
administration should somehow be able to perform that second role. My point
is that as a policy device, it is necessarily limited to addressing the local causes
of whatever problem it is concerned with.
Considering the remarkably intrusive nature of this policy device, there is
no comparable device that intervenes within other states and international
institutions, to try to prevent, as international territorial administration does on
the national level, these states and institutions from making decisions that
contribute to the factors that hamper a recovery from governmental collapse, or
precipitate such a collapse in the first place. So when Helman and Ratner
discuss the "saving" of failed states, their prescription - foreign administration
- is necessarily limited to the indigenous governmental structure. 9 They do not
concern themselves with proposing other, similarly intrusive mechanisms with
respect to, say, rich countries and multinational corporations. Necessarily, the
proscription is reactive, in that it is concerned with responding to state collapse
when it has happened, thereby focusing exclusively on indigenous factors,
rather than seeking to prevent it in the first place, which would require a focus
on both indigenous and exogenous factors.
The result is a somewhat naive and simplistic proposal that fits well with
the narrow notion of responsibility of the "failed state" paradigm. So when
Margaret Karns and Karen Mingst state that the key question for the
international community is what are the responsibilities of states, the United
Nations (or regional IGOs), and other actors when states fail, the responsibilities
in question concern remedial measures of intervention "post-failure" in the
territory concerned, not prophylactic measures concerning the behavior of these
actors that might lead to state collapse in the first place.' Moreover, the
"responsibilities" are conceived in terms suggestive of the charity of innocent
bystanders, not the liability of those who are partially complicit. The sub-title
to Karns and Mingst's question about the international community's

9.

See Helman & Ratner, supra note 1.

10.

Karns & Mingst, supra note 2, at 218.

428

ILSA Journalof International& Comparative Law [Vol. 9:425

responsibilities when states fail is: [h]ow should choices be made as to where
to direct scarce resources?"
The asymmetrical conception of responsibility of the failed state concept,
then, is reflected in and supported by the regime of international policy
institutions. One might venture that this asymmetry is, of course, no accident.
One might ask who uses the language of "failed states" and what their interests
are in doing so. The "failed states" concept originated in Western scholarship,
and has been utilized in Western policy discourse. Examining this language
may be helpful, therefore, in understanding Western ideas of a "failed" other
and a "successful" self. Just as Edward Said studied "Orientalism" interalia as
a way of understanding how Western culture conceives itself through an
alienated, oriental "other," the failed state concept may be illuminating insofar
as our understandings of those who use it are concerned. 12 As a basis for policy,
however, it may be limited, precisely because it reflects the interests of those
who use it, and these interests may conflict with the interests of those in relation
to whom it is used. Indeed, exclusively locally-based connotations of
responsibility exculpate Western states and multinationals, and the international
financial institutions they control, in terms of whatever actions these actors may
have conducted that contributed to the so-called "failure" by the state
concerned. Similarly, these actors do not face the prospect of intrusive policy
institutions, like international territorial administration, that seek to prevent
whatever policies they may prosecute that lead to state collapse.
We have, therefore, a suggestion of responsibility, and an institution for
addressing this responsibility, that only takes in part of the picture. Can this not
be supported, however, as the best that can be hoped for in an unequal world?
Was Helman and Ratner's limited focus an attempt to address legitimate
concerns about state collapse, while staying within the bounds of what was
realistic in terms of the proscription put forward? In the first place, on
pragmatic grounds it may have little effect. The work done on the ground with
local people may be undermined by the absence of comparative processes
operating in those other arenas that are equally determinative of the policies
concerned. Even if this were not the case, however, there is a further problem.
The failed states concept is not only about emphasizing a certain area of
responsibility. It can also be seen as repudiating the notion that responsibility
can reside elsewhere as well. The notion of the failed state, then, and its
associated policy institutions like international territorial administration, may
reflect and constitute not good first steps, but rather the impediments that exist
to broader notions of responsibility and mechanisms for implementing that
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responsibility. The failed state concept not only reflects our unequal world, but
buttresses that inequality. When international territorial administration is used
in circumstances of state collapse, it may be serving merely to distract attention
away from the structural, dxogenous factors that both contributed to the collapse
and will mediate the future economic development of the territory.

